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Abstract Contemporary philosophy of technology, in particular mediation theory,
has largely neglected language and has paid little attention to the social-linguistic
environment in which technologies are used. In order to reintroduce and strengthen
these two missing aspects we turn towards Ricoeur’s narrative theory. We argue that
technologies have a narrative capacity: not only do humans make sense of tech-
nologies by means of narratives but technologies themselves co-constitute narra-
tives and our understanding of these narratives by configuring characters and events
in a meaningful temporal whole. We propose a hermeneutic framework that enables
us to categorise and interpret technologies according to two hermeneutic distinc-
tions. Firstly, we consider the extent to which technologies close in on the paradigm
of the written text by assessing their capacity to actively configure characters and
events into a meaningful whole; thereby introducing a linguistic aspect in the theory
of technological mediation. Secondly, we consider the extent to which technologies
have the capacity to abstract from the public narrative time of actual characters and
events by constructing quasi-characters and quasi-events, thereby introducing the
social in our conception of technological mediation. This leads us to the outlines of
a theory of narrative technologies that revolves around four hermeneutic categories.
In order to show the merits of this theory, we discuss the categories by analysing
paradigmatic examples of narrative technologies: the bridge, the hydroelectric
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Introduction
In recent critiques of contemporary strains of works in philosophy of technology that
focus on mediation, two main concerns appear to be prevalent: neglect of language
and neglect of the social in human dealings with technology. Since the ‘‘empirical
turn’’ (Achterhuis 2001) in the philosophy of technology, the hermeneutic theories of
technology that offer a critique of language and technology (Heidegger, Ellul) were
largely dismissed, which was accompanied by the credo ‘‘to the things themselves’’
(Verbeek 2005: 12)—thereby sacrificing the analysis of language for the analysis of
the material dimension of technology (Coeckelbergh 2015a). Moreover, although it
heavily borrowed from STS, philosophy of technology (especially mediation theory)
began to focus on the individual level, on ‘‘how subjects and objects are co-shaped
rather than how societies and objects are co-shaped’’ (Kaplan 2009: 236). For this
reason, it failed to account for ways in which ‘‘being-with-each-other’’ relations are
instantiated, of how intersubjective relations are mediated by technologies (Van Den
Eede 2010: 140). We aim at overcoming the neglect of language and of the social in
such inquiries about technology.
The urgency of this endeavour is highlighted by discussions outside of
philosophy on the ways technology and language interact in order to shape inter-
subjective relations. In legal studies, Lawrence Lessig argues that the architecture of
computer code regulates our social relations in a similar way law does (Lessig 2006:
235). In economics, the implications of coding language on the economic concept of
the digital commons is emphasized by (Hess and Ostrom 2003). In computer
science, Bergstra and Leeuw (2013) consider the ways in which the design of
computer protocols (language) can impact both the legal concept of ownership (law)
and the economic concept of money. What can be derived from such academic
deliberations is that language, technology, and the social interrelate and co-
constitute one-another. By providing a holistic account of how these apparently
separate spheres mediate one-another, philosophy of technology can add to the
debate.
In order to restore attention to the technological mediation of language and of
inter-subjectivity, we may look within philosophy of technology (for example the
earlier work of Ihde on technology and hermeneutics) or we may look elsewhere
(e.g., philosophy of language, phenomenology, and hermeneutics not usually
associated with philosophy of technology) and explore implications for philosophy
of technology, in particular for mediation theory. In this paper we choose the latter
route: we use the work of Ricoeur to propose a framework to discuss what we call
‘‘narrative technologies’’. Though Ricoeur has already been brought to the attention
of philosophers of technology (Kaplan 2006), a thorough discussion of the way in
which his narrative theory can assist or understanding is still absent.
The impact of narrativity on the design of technology and the constitution of
social life becomes apparent by reviewing literature in different disciplines. In the
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field of computer science, game designers argue that ‘‘choices about the design and
organisation of game spaces have narratological consequences’’ (Jenkins 2003: 129)
and researchers in artificial intelligence argue that the richness of ‘‘narrative
intelligence’’ might solve enigmas resulting from the simplicity of formal
understandings of computer intelligence (Mateas and Sengers 1999). The social
significance of narrativity becomes apparent in discussions about narrative in law
and history of technology. It is argued that narrative constitutes an important aspect
of legal judgement that goes against pure formalist conceptions of law (Patterson
1990). Moreover, social scientists show that technologies like the Internet are
embedded in a ‘‘cultural-narrative’’ (Goodfellow and Hewling 2005) and that
historical events like the Fukushima nuclear disaster are understood according to
multiple narratives that show an interplay of technology, politics, and society (Jones
et al. 2013). Hence, narrativity is an issue of great interest for studies of technology,
the humanities, and for the social sciences.
The question that guides the inquiry in this paper is whether Ricoeur’s narrative
theory discloses an understanding of technology that includes an account of how
technology mediates language and inter-subjectivity. We start by elaborating on the
neglect of language and the social in philosophy of technology and on the way Ricoeur
incorporates them in his theories. Subsequently, we present a brief exposition of the
concept of configuration in Ricoeur’s narrative theory, followed by a discussion of the
implications of his theory for our understanding of technology. Accordingly, we
construct a theory of narrative technologies based on Ricoeur’s narrative theory that
clarifies the narrative capacities of technology according to the distinctions between
passive and active and between abstract and engaging narrative technologies. We
discuss the analytic merits of these hermeneutic distinctions by examining the
technological mediations of four paradigmatic technologies (the bridge, the hydroelec-
tric plant, video games, and monetary technologies) in light of our narrative framework.
Language and the Social in Ricoeur’s Narrative Theory
Contemporary philosophy of technology, in particular mediation theory, discusses
how technologies shape subjectivity and how they mediate agency—perhaps even
possess agency as non-human actors. For example, Verbeek shows that experiences
and actions are materially, technologically mediated (2005: 123). New technologies
change, or rather co-shape our mediated subjectivity. Yet, in these theories and
discussions considerations with regards to the role of language are often simply
absent. There is a subject and an object, there are persons and artefacts, there are
human and non-human agents, but words, sentences, grammar, and narratives do not
enter the stage. This is not only problematic because of the impoverished
conceptualisation of subjectivity and self as having little to do with language; it also
neglects the social-linguistic environment and horizon, which is entangled with
technologies and technological practices.
This neglect illustrates how mediation theory became divorced from its main
intellectual sources: it is inspired by Ihde’s (post-) phenomenology, but in its urge to
reject what it takes to be Heideggerian ‘‘pessimism’’ it turned to the artefact, to
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‘‘things’’ (Verbeek 2005). By doing so, it has become remote from a central theme
in phenomenology and hermeneutics: language. Moreover, it has heavily borrowed
from Science and Technology Studies (STS), but has used its concepts mainly to
highlight the material-personal aspects of technologies while neglecting their
linguistic-social dimensions. For example, mediation theory has used work by
Latour and Akrich to talk about the ‘‘script’’ of artefacts, but this concept has been
mainly used metaphorically to focus on the agency of artefacts without paying
attention to the suggestion that there may be a sense in which artefacts write or
speak, a way in which technologies have a linguistic dimension. Furthermore, the
script of artefacts as borrowed from actor network theory is treated as if it is isolated
from a wider social-linguistic environment (prescriptions, discourse, narratives).
We propose to remedy the neglect of language and the social in contemporary
philosophy of technology (and in particular postphenomenological mediation
theory) by introducing the concept of ‘‘narrative technologies’’. To put this concept
to work we require a theory of narrative, for which we will draw on the work of Paul
Ricoeur, who is widely known for his insights into the narrative and social aspects
of the human being but whose work has been rarely used in philosophy of
technology. An exception to this silence is a paper by David Kaplan, which
identifies ways in which Ricoeur can contribute to philosophy of technology. First
of all, Kaplan argues that text discussed by Ricoeur as ‘‘a paradigm for the linguistic
mediation of experience’’ (2006: 49), is similar to technologies that are ‘‘readable’’.
Moreover, he argues that Ricoeur’s work can explicate the ways in which
technologies mediate social meanings. Finally, he asserts that Ricoeur can assist
philosophy of technology in explicating the ‘‘different ways that technologies
figure into our lives’’ (2006: 50). However, Kaplan remains silent about what a
proposed synthesis of philosophy of technology and Ricoeur’s work might actually
look like: about how we can understand technologies by deploying this theoretical
framework. We aim at going beyond the mere identification of theoretical
advantages by integrating them into an actual theory of narrative technologies.
Before going into Ricoeur’s theory of narrativity, we briefly reflect on the
position of narrative in philosophical debates. Two major points of divergence can
be distinguished. Firstly, an opposition exists between those who consider narrative
as an instrumental cognitive ability—a cognitive ability to impose meaningful order
onto human reality or experience—and those who consider it as an ontological
category that is indivisible from the way humans are in the world (Meretoja 2014:
89). One the one hand, scholars such as White and Mink characterise narrative as a
‘‘manner of speaking’’ (White 1980: 7) or a ‘‘mode of comprehension’’ (Mink 1970:
549) of aspects of the world. On the other hand, others such as MacIntyre and
Ricoeur argue for the ‘‘narrative character of human life’’ (MacIntyre 2007: 144)
and point to the relation between narrative and time: ‘‘time becomes human to the
extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode’’ (Ricoeur 1983: 52; original
emphasis). Secondly, an opposition exists between those who defend an empiricist
tradition that assigns primacy to the human immediate experience of the present and
therefore denounces narrative as a fundamental philosophical concept and those
who reject the idea of unmediated experience in support of the philosophical
significance of narrative. Philosophers such as Strawson and Sartre claim that
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human experience is not necessarily mediated by narrative (Strawson 2004: 429)
and that ‘‘unmediated awareness is basic’’ (Duncan 2005: 108), by which they
oppose thinkers such as Taylor, who argues for a ‘‘science of interpretation’’ (Taylor
1971: 4) based on the presupposition that all representations of the world are
mediated by human interpretation. Ricoeur belongs to the philosophical tradition
that supports narrative as an ontological category and therefore as a fundamental
mediator of human experience. As such, he rejects the Cartesian notion of direct
access to oneself and ‘‘reflects on how subjectivity is always mediated by the ‘long
detour’ of ‘signs, symbols and texts’’’ (Meretoja 2014: 96). In order to show how
Ricoeur incorporates the two enigmas of contemporary philosophy of technology
discussed previously, we will consider the role of language and the social in his
work.
Ricoeur and Language
Unlike philosophers who focus on the material dimension of technological
mediation, Ricoeur has a primary interest in human language. In his writings about
language, he incorporates ideas from both the Anglo-American tradition (commonly
referred to as ‘‘analytic’’) and the European tradition (commonly referred to as
‘‘continental’’); which motivate him to go as far as comparing the works of two
philosophers who are at face value each-others opposites: Husserl and Wittgenstein
(Ricoeur 2014). In his interpretation of works of language, he especially focuses on
the ‘‘grasp of language on experience’’ (2014: 29), on the way human language
mediates human experience. To illustrate this grasp of language on experience, we
can consider our knowledge of traffic rules (when such-and-such a situation occurs,
I react like this) as a determinant of our experience of a traffic situation, or our
knowledge of ritualistic protocols during the experience of a ceremony (e.g., the
installation of a new president occurs when such-and-such declarations are uttered).
In both these cases, the way we experience the situation is mediated by our
understanding and use of language. Central to Ricoeur’s understanding of language
lies the interpretation of text, which he argues can be seen as a model for
meaningful action. Put differently, Ricoeur argues that humans interpret their every-
day actions as configured by narratives, of which texts are the paradigmatic
reification (Meretoja 2014: 98). A very clear example of such a text is a diary, in
which personal interpretations of every-day action are recounted (Hassam 1990).
Ricoeur’s ideas about language are strongly influenced by Heidegger, though he
is much more sympathetic to formalist theories that aim at providing atomistic
explanations of language. A major premise that Ricoeur employs throughout his
work is that human linguistic-mediated experience is characterised by temporality:
by the ‘‘within-time-ness’’ of human experience. Human experience and action,
according to Ricoeur, are essentially mediated by language within a temporal
setting, and hence are not dependent on point-like, unmediated experiences of the
present. In ‘‘Narrative Time,’’ Ricoeur asserts: ‘‘my first working hypothesis is that
narrativity and temporality are closely related—as closely as, in Wittgenstein’s
terms, a language game and a form of life’’ (1980: 169). As such, when we consider
the ‘‘time’’ of an action (‘‘it’s time to go to work’’), our temporal understanding of
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the world is mediated by language in the narrative form. Just how closely narrativity
and temporality are related is the major subject of discussion in Ricoeur’s seminal
work Time and Narrative, which will be our major source for constructing a theory
of narrative technologies.
At this point we have shown what Ricoeur has to offer to our understanding of
language and narrative, which will enable us, in a later section, to address the
neglect of language in contemporary philosophy of technology. But we still need to
say more about the social in order to address the neglect of the social. What role
does the social play in Ricoeur’s work?
Ricoeur and the Social
Throughout his work, Ricoeur stresses the importance of interpreting human
existence by considering its embeddedness in human social reality. In line with the
‘‘within-time-ness’’ of the individual, Ricoeur argues: ‘‘the time of narrative is
public time’’ (1980: 175; emphasis added). Moreover, he asserts ‘‘public time, as we
saw, is not anonymous time of ordinary representation but the time of interaction. In
this sense, narrative time is, from the outset, time of being-with-others’’ (1980: 188).
Hence, Ricoeur asserts that the social is explicitly present in narrative time, which
remains a time of interactions between people without being made anonymous,
separated from human experience and action (as for example can conversely be said
about the time of science that is derived from natural laws rather than from human
experience).
Because narrative time is a public time that is not detached from the human
spheres of experience and action, Ricoeur perceives the reification of narrative in
written text as the paradigmatic object of hermeneutics (1971: 316). In successive
order, Ricoeur asserts that the time of human experience and action is made public
in narrative time and that narrative time finds its reification in written text. Hence,
through the retrodiction of text, which entails the utilisation of textual information
to infer or explain an event or state of affairs, Ricoeur asserts that one can analyse
the public time of human action and experience.1 In other words, we can gain
knowledge about the social by means of retrodiction of narrative aspects of texts.
In order to address the role of the social in Ricoeur’s work and the way it matches
with our focus on technology, it seems worthwhile to draw a line of comparison
between the critique of technological mediation of Van Den Eede and Ricoeur’s
narrative theory. When we consider Van Den Eede’s critique of technological
mediation we can observe that he uses a term that is almost similar to Ricoeur’s
‘‘being-with-others’’: the technological mediation of ‘‘being-with-each-other’’
(2010: 140). Van Den Eede argues that these intersubjective mediations, which
he claims are largely neglected by theories of technological mediation, are
specifically applicable to ICTs because they are highly mediated by linguistic
constructs. However, we will propose a broader application of Ricoeur’s theory and
1 Notably, such use of the characteristics of narrative in order to understand narrative as a ‘‘form of
natural action description’’ is also taken up by structuralist approaches (van Dijk 1974: 287).
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turn to his work in order to solve the gaps of language and the social in theories of
technological mediation in general.
Ricoeur’s Narrative Theory
Before we turn towards the question of narrative technology we now engage in a
brief and systematic compendium of Ricoeur’s narrative theory, focusing on his
account of configuration as this concept will be central in our further enquiry. The
starting point for the formulation of Ricoeur’s theory is the hypothesis that ‘‘time
becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and
narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal
existence’’ (1983: 52; emphasis in original). We might need to recall that Ricoeur
considers temporal existence particular to humans as a social existence, while he
considers narrative time to be a public time. Put differently, human temporal
experience embedded in a social setting is shaped through a narrative mode of
language.
What then, is this ‘‘narrative mode’’? Ricoeur claims that the mediation between
time and narrative that is implied in this mode revolves around a process that he
designates as emplotment. He derives his theory of emplotment from Aristotle’s
Poetics, grounding it in three stages of mimesis, meaning ‘‘the active process of
imitating or representing something’’ (1983: 33). Aristotle himself says about
mimesis that ‘‘the instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood’’ and that
man has the ‘‘instinct for ‘harmony’ and rhythm’’ (1902: 15). Thus, the significance
of understanding this process goes beyond the realm of literature and finds its
philosophical substance in its purported grounding in human existence in general.
Aristotle’s definition of mimesis is derived from the overriding principle of muthos,
which designates the plot. ‘‘The plot is the imitation of the action:—for by the plot I
mean here the arrangement of incidents’’ (Aristotle 1902: 25). From this, Ricoeur
derives that emplotment designates the organisation of events (incidents2) by which
people represent action in a plot. Paradigmatic examples are works of tragedy and
comedy in which characters imitate probable accounts of human actions structured
according to a play script, which is an organisation of events (or ‘‘acts’’).
In a narrative like a tragedy, the plot configures different elements like characters,
motivations, and events in a meaningful whole. Emplotment, so to say, creates a
harmonious concordance out of discordant, heterogeneous elements. Therefore, the
movement of a plot is a teleological principle, an ‘‘inexorable movement that drives
the story toward an anticipated conclusion’’ (Dowling 2011: 6). It makes us say: this
story makes sense. How then, does emplotment shape the human experience of public
time? Essentially, this amounts to the movement of prefigured time that becomes a
refigured time through the mediation of configured time (Ricoeur 1983: 54). For
instance, when reading Plato’s allegory of the cave our prefigured ideas of human
knowledge in the prefigured time (before reading) change by means of the text in the
configured time (during reading) and is subsequently synthesised with our experience
2 Ricoeur explicitly refers to ‘‘events’’ rather than ‘‘incidents’’ while he later in his work concludes that
an event as implied in a text might cover a very extensive time-span (1983: 217).
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of the world in the refigured time (after reading). The reading of Plato’s allegory, so to
say, changes our experience of the world. This movement of ‘‘narrative time’’ is
formed by means of emplotment, and consists of three moments:
• Mimesis1: the pre-figurative phase. This phase consists of the understanding of
the world of action: its semantics, its symbolic order, and its temporality.
• Mimesis2: the configurative phase, constituted by emplotment. Emplotment is
the organisation of events, both chronologically (according to an episodic
sequence) and a-chronologically (reflecting between the parts and the whole
with a sense of ending).
• Mimesis3: the refigurative phase of reading. This concludes the narrative circle,
of applying narrative to the world of action.
Mimesis1 refers to our pre-understanding of the human world of action. According
to Ricoeur, this pre-understanding can be analysed by considering its three basic
conditions: human competence to identify action in terms of its structure, human
competence to identify the symbolic mediations of actions, and the human
understanding of the temporal elements of action. As such, mimesis1 indicates the
initial moment at the beginning of the reading of a text, a moment that is embedded in
a social context—in a human ‘repertoire’ from which we engage with new social
phenomena. However, mimesis1 extends beyond the text, while it concerns the realm
of human action in a social setting that is already mediated by narrative. For example,
we understand the act of going through the passport control at an airport because we
understand the structure of the act (if I’m asked my passport, I hand it over), we
understand the symbolic mediations (‘‘EU’’ desk for EU citizens) and we understand
the temporal setting (first I do x, then the official does y).
Mimesis2, the stage of narrative configuration, is central in Ricoeur’s work and
makes explicit how a narrative can configure our pre-figured time. Since it
constitutes the principal feature of our theory of narrative technologies, we put our
central focus on it. The key notion of narrative configuration is the movement of
emplotment: the mediation of pre-figured time my means of a plot. The plot
mediates between individual events and the whole of a story, it brings together
heterogeneous factors (agents, goals, interactions) belonging to the realm of action
(mimesis1) into a syntagmatic order and it mediates the temporal dimensions of pre-
figured time. For instance, in the famous narrative Oedipus Rex several heteroge-
neous characters (Oedipus’ mother, his lover, his father, the king), events
(prophecies, trials, and murders), and goals (trying to evade the prophecy, aiming
to know its truth) are brought together in a syntagmatic narrative whole, which
constitutes the story’s surprising, but acceptable, resolution. Ricoeur elaborates
upon the mediation of pre-figured time by introducing the idea of two temporal
dimensions in the process of emplotment: chronological and a-chronological
dimensions of narrative time. The chronological dimension is concerned with an
episodic arrangement of events, which characterises the narrative in terms of
sequence of events (firstly this happened, secondly this happened) (Ricoeur 1983:
66). The a-chronological dimension of narrative time is concerned with the
configuration of events in a meaningful whole. This implies that the organisation of
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events is made intelligible, or rather ‘‘followable’’ (referring to the human ability to
‘‘follow’’ a story) in such a way that the order of events leads to a conclusion that
characterises the narrative as a whole; that renders its resolution, according to
Ricoeur, acceptable for the reader. It is through the mediation of the a-chronological
temporal dimension of a narrative that we can proclaim: this story makes sense.
In order to clarify the opposition between the chronological and a-chronological
(configurational) arrangements, Ricoeur mentions three ways in which they differ,
by mentioning capacities of a-chronological configuration that are absent in purely
chronological arrangements: (1) the capacity to oscillate between events and the
meaning of the story as a whole, (2) the capacity to impose a sense of ending on a
narrative, and (3) the ability to ‘‘read time’’ backwards, from ending to beginning
and beginning to end. Although a purely chronological account of an event would
imply a sequence from minute to minute or from year to year (like keeping a formal
log), a narrative can relate events to a whole (‘‘D-day was the turning point of the
Second World War’’), it can include a sense of ending (‘‘the funeral of Hektor
indicated the end of the Troyan war’’) and it can be read backwards or forwards
(including ‘‘flashbacks’’ like in Virgil’s Aeneid).
Subsequently, we highlight two aspects of the configurative phase of emplotment
that are of importance for our theory of narrative technologies. Firstly, Ricoeur
argues that the conclusion of a narrative does not need to be predictable but rather
acceptable. To defend this claim, he analyses the notion of causal explanation in the
paradigm of historical narratives (being narratives about ‘‘real’’ events as opposed to
fictional narratives). Although he rejects the idea of historical explanation with
recourse to laws, he tries to preserve causal analysis and rational explanation in
history (1983: 128). If we consider explanation of historical facts, Ricoeur argues,
we ask for a necessary condition and not for a sufficient, law-like condition. For
example, if we ask: ‘‘how was it possible that Austria-Hungary declared war on
Serbia in 1914?’’ we might ask for a necessary condition, which was the
assassination of Franz Ferdinand. However, the murder is not a sufficient condition
for the declaration of the war. In order to explain historical facts, we need to take
into account the teleology that guides the events that make up history, which is
grounded in the world of action of individual people. History is concerned with the
realm of action, but action that is placed in a society that has already been
configured through narrative activity. For these reasons, we can only explain a
historical fact by means of retrodiction, not by prediction. This claim is important
for our understanding of technological mediation, for it enables us to argue against
technological determinism. If technologies mediate human narrative time, as we
argue, they only provide for necessary reasons and not for sufficient reasons for
technologically mediated action. Things could have turned out differently.
Secondly, Ricoeur discusses the way in which structures in historical narrative can
be abstracted from the configured time of the plot. For example, when we make
assertions like ‘‘Germany attacked France in May 1940’’: we do not refer to actual
events with actual characters but to abstracted instances of those. However, Ricoeur
argues that as soon as we try to subject such a historical statement to causal
explanation, we eventually enter the configured time of mimesis2. In this mode of
explanation, we would need to include the agency of people that act in a historical
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context. For instance, if we would ask for an explanation of the historical statement
discussed above, a historian could start by saying something like ‘‘Hitler ordered the
creation of a new military policy in case the Western powers would reject his peace
proposal after his invasion of Poland…’’. Hence, the historian would focus his
attention on actual events (an order) and characters (the leader, his generals) in a plot,
thereby moving from second and third order to first order entities. For that reason,
Ricoeur argues that second and third order entities in history can be considered as
‘‘quasi-events’’ and ‘‘quasi-characters’’ that figure in ‘‘quasi-plots’’. They are
abstractions of actual characters and events but nonetheless refer back to those in
the case explanations are asked for. This is important to note for our understanding of
technologies because it provides for an understanding of the ways in which
technologically mediated characters and events can be abstracted from actual human
characters and events. The following scheme provides an approximate representation
of the way second and third order entities in history refer back to the narrative level
and therefore the realm of human action according to Ricoeur’s theory.
Levels of Configuration in Historical Narrative
I Action (Mimesis1): the level of action of people in society that is already
prefigured through narrative activity.
II Emplotment (Mimesis2): the level of organisation of events in which characters
operate.
III First order historical entities: the level of characters in historical narrative that
refer back to level I, through level II.
IV Second and third order entities: the level of historical entities like countries
and civilizations that refer back to level III through a dissonance between
explanatory structures. These entities constitute ‘‘quasi-events,’’ ‘‘quasi-characters,’’
and ‘‘quasi-plots’’.
At this point, we can summarise the core theory of mimesis2, the configuration
phase in narrative activity. A text configures our narrative understanding my means
of the plot, which refers to the organisation of events. This organisation includes a
chronological sequence of events and an a-chronological organisation of these
events to constitute a narrative. A plot can be explained by assessing the probability
of its conclusion, which can be done by means of retrodiction: considering
necessary but not sufficient conditions. Actual characters and events in the plot can
be abstracted into quasi-characters and quasi-events in a quasi-plot. We can trace
back these quasi-elements of a story by considering their analogical use in relation
to the actual characters figuring in actual events.
To finish, we will only shortly touch upon mimesis3, while it is predominantly
mimesis2, the configuration phase that will inspire the construction of our theory of
narrative technologies. The refiguration of narrative, or the application of the
narrative, designates the ‘‘intersection of the world of text and the world of the
hearer or reader’’ (Ricoeur 1983: 71). Hence, this phase of the narrative ‘‘closes’’ the
narrative circle: we have finished reading a text whereby our narrative understand-
ing has been transformed. We see the world in a different light, so to say, because
our prefigured time has been refigured through the configuration of the text.
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Towards a Theory of Narrative Technologies
This paper is meant as an initial step in the development of a comprehensive theory
of narrative technologies. In the previous section we showed how Ricoeur deals
with the aspects of language and the social in his work. In line with this analysis, we
argue that his narrative theory would be suitable for dealing with these aspects that
have been so far largely neglected in philosophy of technology. Moreover, we
drafted the outlines of Ricoeur’s narrative theory in order to have the basis of our
theoretical apparatus in place. In the following section, we will construct the
outlines of a hermeneutic theory of narrative technologies that opens up a novel way
of thinking about technological mediation.
Narrative Beyond Storytelling: From Text to Technology
As an initial concern, we face the challenge of reconciling Ricoeur’s narrative
theory with an understanding of technology. At face value, textual narratives and
material technologies seem to be far apart. Consider for instance the apparent gap
between literary texts that Ricoeur (1985) deals with in the second volume of Time
and Narrative like Proust’s Remembrance of things past and technologies like cars,
computers, and cameras. Stories are completely made up of words and sentences
while cars are made up of materials like plastics and steel. However, Ricoeur (1985)
already points at the generality of his theory by mentioning a taxonomy of classes of
narrative that includes ‘‘myths, folklore, fables, novels, epics, tragedies, dramas,
films, comic strips, to say nothing of history, painting and conversation’’. Moreover,
he claims that the narrative understanding engraved in history also applies to
disciplines like ‘‘cosmology, geology, and biology’’ (1983: 135). Thus, his theory of
narrative configuration can go beyond the works of literary fiction and history and
can even include visual objects like paintings and knowledge in the scientific field
of biology.
One of the reasons why Ricoeur himself remains relatively silent on the topic of
technology is because he seemingly upholds a dichotomy between technological
rationality and knowledge about the human world as it is expressed through history
and fiction3 (Kaplan 2002: 2). Ricoeur’s inquiry seems to be exclusively limited to
knowledge about the human world of culture. In Questioning Technology, Feenberg
discusses a similar dichotomy, by problematizing Habermas’s distinction between
‘‘an objective realm of technically rational means and a subjective realm of ends
values and means’’ (1999: 177). Both Habermas and Ricoeur, so it seems, aim at
preserving a realm of objective rationality in our design and use of technology that
is freed from human acts of subjective valuation. However, such a standpoint is
untenable when considering the necessity of including the ‘‘use-context’’ (Ihde
3 However, Ricoeur’s stance on technology might actually be more nuanced, while he places himself
between Habermas and Gadamer on the issue of tradition and the role of language (Bilimoria 1998). He
argues that all of language is built on tradition (pre-figured reality), but that it can still function as an
innovative means for formulating a critique on tradition (re-figured reality). If we place technology in this
discussion, the dichotomy proposed earlier seems to be fairly weak while Ricoeur actually endorses the
view that all understanding (also technical understanding) is embedded in a tradition.
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2009; Verbeek 2005) or the ‘‘realisation’’ (Feenberg 1999) of technologies while
investigating their meaning. Technologies cannot be understood as isolated entities,
but only through a consideration of their use in human interaction.
Once we dismiss the strict dichotomy between technical understanding and
narrative understanding, we open up the possibility of employing the latter to
investigate the first. To do so, we need to ask: to what extent can it be said that
technology brings about a ‘‘plot’’ in similar ways as a text does? In other words, the
central question for thinking about technologies in a ‘‘narrative’’ way is: can
technologies configure our narrative understanding in similar ways as written texts
do? Kaplan has already given some initial answers to this question. He argues that
narrative theory can be used in order to interpret the way in which humans ‘‘read’’
technology (2006: 49). Moreover, he points out that there are certain ways in which
humans can construct plots to understand technology, for example by telling about
the motivations for designing a technology (2002: 4). However, taking into
considerations the lessons learned from theories of technological mediation, we
want to make explicit the ways humans and technologies co-shape each other by
using the concept of narrative technologies. In other words, we argue that humans
do not only read technologies, but technologies on the other hand ‘‘read’’ the human.
If we then take Ricoeur’s narrative theory serious, we need to see the ‘‘reading’’ as a
reciprocal process. Therefore, the term ‘‘configuration’’ as it is used in mimesis2
seems more suitable here, implying that a configuration of the technology by
humans denotes a corresponding configuration of the human by technology.
Let us then briefly reflect upon the characteristics of emplotment that can be
found in the design and use of technologies. In order to defend the claim that
technologies configure our narrative understanding we need to show that—just as
texts—they are involved in the organisation of events. Moreover, we need to defend
the claim that the organisation of events includes both chronological and
a-chronological dimensions of narrative time. As a starting point, we consider the
way technology design is characterised in design literature to ascertain a clearly
narrative structure that is used to characterise the functioning of technologies. We
might consider the passage about the ‘‘confirmation principle’’ in technology design
as captured by Lidwell et al. as an example:
Confirmation using a dialog involves establishing a verbal interaction with
the person using the system. It is most commonly represented as a dialog box
on a software display (e.g., ‘‘Are you sure you want to delete all files?’’). In
this method, dialog boxes directly ask the user if the action was intended and
if they would like to proceed. (2003: 44; emphasis added)
In this passage, which serves as a guideline for design, heterogeneous factors
including characters (people and, more specifically, users), events (action, verbal
interaction, representation), and motives (want and intention) are brought together
in a coherent whole, in a plot. However, we do not only want to show that designers
use narrative approaches to understand the technologies they create; we want to go
further by showing that technologies themselves configure a plot. In the use of a
technology, both the technology and the user configure an organisation of events.
For example, when using a car a driver enters the car, puts his seat in the right
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position, adjusts the mirrors, starts the engine, is given visual feedback about the
amount of gas in the tank, drives away from the parking spot. These events are
implied in the way the technology is constructed and the way the human
understands it, the car configures them. However, the sequence is not strictly
chronological. Some events are determined in a chronological order, like starting the
engine before driving away. In contrast, adjusting the seat or the mirrors can be done
in many different orders; such events are organised according to an a-chronological
dimension. Moreover, applied to technology the a-chronological dimension of
configuration also means that one of the events only makes sense within the larger
whole. For example, adjusting the mirrors refers back to the driving plot as a whole
and indeed to the practice-as-narrative: it ties in with the narrative about what good,
virtuous driving is (e.g., driving includes taking into account and responding to the
actions of others).
This notion that both technology and humans configure an organisation of events
is important since it conceptualises, from within a narrative approach, a key insight
in contemporary philosophy of technology since Heidegger: technologies are not
mere instrumental means, but co-shape human meaning and human action. We
claim that humans and technology configure the narrative practices in which they
are involved, and do so in a way that involves public, social time. The
entanglements of humans and technologies do not take place in a timeless world;
there is a narrative time, there is a plot.
Thus, by using Ricoeur we can convincingly support the claim that technologies
have the capacity to configure plots, understood as organisations of events.
However, we need to expand the theory of narrative technologies in order to
understand the different ways in which technologies are involved in the
configuration of narrative time. From here, we will further theorise the relation
between technology designs and the kind of narrative they instantiate.
Hermeneutics of Narrative Technologies
We employ Ricoeur’s narrative theory in order to present a structured approach to
understanding technologies according to their narrative capacity. With ‘‘narrative
capacity,’’ we refer to the extent to which a technology closes in on the paradigm of
a text. Since we consider narrative as an ontological category (as a condition for
human, socially embedded experience), we argue that narrative structures mediate
all human interactions with technologies. However, we argue that the narrative
capacity of technologies increases whenever technologies get more textual. For
instance, although an ancient technology like fire is embedded within a cultural and
symbolic, narratively prefigured time (e.g., as a symbol of progress, of war, of
civilization), it is far from being itself textual; remaining close to the non-textual
character of the natural world. At the other side of the hermeneutic spectrum, one
finds technologies like bookkeeping systems. These technologies are highly textual:
they are made up of linguistic elements and textually represent specific aspects of
the human life world.
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In our theoretical framework, we refer to technologies that are far removed from
the paradigm of the text as passive narrative technologies. They configure human
reality, but predominantly so as elements of human prefigured time (mimesis1).
Conversely, we refer to technologies that are very proximate to the paradigm of the
text as active narrative technologies (mimesis2). Those technologies actively
configure prefigured human time by organising represented characters and events in
a plot. Accordingly, the first hermeneutic distinction we apply to analyse narrative
technologies is concerned with the extent to which technologies are capable of
constituting an active process of configuration. One can think of this distinction by
considering the degree of ‘‘authorship’’ of both humans and technologies. Although
all technologies involve some degree of ‘‘co-authorship’’ in organising events,
certain technologies are more active than others in configuring our narrative
understanding. What we call passive narrative technologies in our theory refers to
technologies that are part of narrative structures that are mainly created by humans,
whereas what call active technologies play a larger role in co-creating the narrative
structures. This first hermeneutic distinction captures the relation between language
and technology that we have shown to be missing in most of the works of
contemporary philosophy of technology. By analysing technologies according to the
way they configure a narrative plot, or more specifically how they organise
characters and events in a meaningful whole, we can understand the way they
linguistically mediate human experience.
Next to the abovementioned distinction between active and passive narrative
technologies, Ricoeur’s theory shows us that narrative technological mediation can
either stay very close to the world of human action or be abstracted from it.4 Here
the question is one of distance: distance between the configured narrative structure
and the technologically mediated world of human action. Similar to abstracting
texts, the mediations of abstracting narrative technologies are removed from the
realm of action by means of configuring quasi-characters and quasi-events in a plot.
These are what Ricoeur calls second- and third-order entities: they are not actual
characters or events but abstract versions of these first-order entities. The process
that leads to these abstractions is typical for modern technologies, most notably for
modern ‘‘time’’ technologies (clocks, recording devices). Ricoeur writes that
modern machines that measure time enable an abstract representation of time:
‘‘Care to the world’s light, saying-now retains its existential meaning, but when the
machines that serve to measure time are divested of this primary reference to natural
measures, that saying-now returns to the abstract representation of time’’ (1983: 63).
Modern times are, literally, made possible by new technologies of timing, which
create a distance between natural phenomena such as the sun (and shadow) and the
experience of time. The technologies have changed the way we live and have altered
the narratives of our lives and of our societies. Similarly to the technology of the
modern clock, Fordist production technologies such as the conveyer belt abstract
from the narrative of engaging labour of the artisan.
4 With regards to technology, this distinction can notably be found in Heidegger’s (1977) essay The
Question Concerning Technology.
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Thus, the second hermeneutic distinction we apply in our theory to analyse
narrative technologies is concerned with the extent to which technological
mediation abstracts from the realm of human action. Abstracting narrative
technologies create a distance between the narrative structure they configure and
the world of action that revolves around a narrative of actual characters and events.
Conversely, engaging narrative technologies capture the other end of the
hermeneutic spectrum: they do not abstract, but configure a narrative as a direct
interaction between characters in actual events; similar to the Greek tragedy
Aristotle wrote about in Poetics. Although the potential for technologically
mediated abstraction in the modern world is increasing, most notably in the form of
ICTs, modern technologies are also capable of engaging people (as for example in
the case of video games as will be discussed below). Note that this second
distinction effectively captures the social dimension of narrative technologies, for
these degrees of abstraction mediate intersubjective (or ‘‘being-with-others’’)
relations. Engaging narrative technologies, ones that remain close to the config-
uration of a plot, organise events and characters in a public, social time. Abstracting
narrative technologies construct quasi-characters and quasi-events that comprise
multitudes of social relations (as is for instance the case with quasi-characters like
markets, companies, and nation states). Thus, by introducing this second
hermeneutic distinction we are able to explicitly incorporate the social in our
account of technological mediation.
As a result of our construction of the two hermeneutic distinctions that we apply
to understand the notion of narrative technologies, we present a matrix with four
hermeneutic categories. These categories represent conceptual spaces that capture
the intersections of the extremes of the two distinctions. While working with these
categories, one needs to recall that the differences implied in the hermeneutic
distinctions (between passive and active; engaging and abstracting narrative
technologies) are differences in degree rather than in kind, because they depend on
an interpretation of the technology. In accordance with the ‘‘empirical turn’’ in
philosophy of technology, this ties in with the idea that inquiries into the narrative
capacity of technologies need to be empirically informed. Only through empirical
reflections, the degree of activity and abstraction of narrative technologies can be
established. Below, we present our matrix that incorporates the hermeneutic
categories, each of which is illustrated by means of a paradigmatic example of a
narrative technology.
Analyses of Narrative Technologies: The Hermeneutic Categories Set
to Work
Thus far, we have presented our theoretical framework of narrative technologies
according to the two hermeneutic distinctions we discussed. In this last section, we
will demonstrate the merits of our framework by engaging in separate discussions of
the four hermeneutic categories that revolve around paradigmatic examples of
narrative technologies displayed in our matrix (Table 1): the wooden bridge, the
hydroelectric plant, video games, and electronic money.
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Passive, Engaging Technologies
The first hermeneutic category in our framework is concerned with narrative
technologies that are passive elements of our narrative time and mediate
organisations of first order events and characters. We discuss the paradigmatic
example of the wooden bridge, as it figures in Heideggers essay The Question
Concerning Technology. He argues that the bridge is ‘‘built into the Rhine River’’
and ‘‘joined bank with bank for hundreds or years’’ (1977: 16). An important
element of Heideggers analysis is the notion that the bridge has been part of the
human life world for multiple generations. However, at the time when it was built, it
did configure human narrative time by organising characters and events (merchants,
armies, trades, and wars) in a narrative whole. In other words, the bridge actively
configured the narrative time of the people interacting with the bridge once it was
build. However, at the point where the time of the bridge surpassed the time of the
humans who build it, it gradually became a passive element of the prefigured
narrative time. That is, the bridge became an element of the cultural ‘‘repertoire’’ of
the humans interacting with it and it an element of narratives about the bridge,
authored by humans (as in Ho¨lderlin’s hymn mentioned by Heidegger). That the
wooden bridge is an engaging technology can be argued for by considering the
characters and events it instantiates. Although those who interact with the bridge are
always placed in a narrative time (they are not anonymous bridge-crossers but
rather travellers, merchants, soldiers), the organisation of characters and events they
engage in by means of interaction with the bridge is close to the world of action.
The social relations that are configured by this interaction are relations of first order
characters (for example of merchants) engaging in first order events (for example in
a trade of agricultural products).
Passive, Abstracting Technologies
The second hermeneutic category in our framework is concerned with narrative
technologies that are passive elements of our narrative time and instantiate a
technological mediation that abstracts from the world of action. Again, consider
Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology, which provides another
paradigmatic example of technology: the hydroelectric plant (1977: 16). The
Rhine supplies hydraulic pressure, which sets the turbines turning and creates
electric current. Now this power plant is a passive narrative technology in the
sense that it predominantly has a place in prefigured narrative time. When it was
Table 1 Overview of the hermeneutic categories of narrative technologies, including paradigmatic
examples narrative technologies that fit these categories
Narrative technologies Engaging Abstracting
Passive Bridge Hydroelectric plant
Active Video games Monetary technologies
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built, it actively configured the narrative of energy production and consumption:
configuring workers, consumers, working shifts, and emergency plans. But in the
passing of human time it has become part of the way things are done. Things are
following their normal course, literally. The plant has become part of the
narrative time of hydraulic energy, of its cultural repertoire, which was written
in the past by humans. However, in contrast to the bridge the power plant is not
an engaging but rather an abstracting narrative technology. It has been removed
from the world of action of its surroundings. It has configured a narrative
structure of characters and events (mechanics, people consuming power in their
houses), but is itself removed form that narrative. Whereas the wooden bridge
instantiates a configuration of first-order characters and events, placed in
narrative time, the hydroelectric plant configures quasi-characters and quasi-
events such as energy markets, energy grids, energy companies, and ‘interlock-
ing processes’—to use Heidegger’s words again. The energy markets, the energy
grids and so on are not first-order characters, and their configuration does not
constitute first-order events. There is a ‘system’ (according to Heidegger: a
process of ‘enframing’). The narrative is abstracted by means of the configu-
ration of higher-order entities. It is not experienced as being about actual
characters and events, close to the realm of human action, but it has become
abstracted from the people who work at the plant and the people who use
electricity. Moreover, the hydroelectric plant configures a narrative structure that
predominantly revolves around chronological time dimensions vis-a`-vis
a-chronological time dimensions. The ‘‘proper’’ functioning of the plant requires
strict sequences of events, dictated by the time technologies like the clock
(working shifts, regular controls of the machinery).
Active, Engaging Technologies
The third hermeneutic category in our framework is concerned with narrative
technologies that actively configure human narrative time and mediate organisations
of first order events and characters. We will discuss a paradigmatic type of
technologies that are capable of engaging people in a narrative structure: video
games. First of all, we consider the degree of active configuration. All forms of
human–computer interaction involve mediation by symbolic and textual informa-
tion. ICTs and humans often ‘‘co-author’’ and ‘‘co-act’’ the narratives they engage in
and co-constitute. This, in turn, influences the configuration of both the human and
the technology. Thus, in contrast to passive narrative technologies active narrative
technologies like video games continue to configure narrative structures whenever
people interact with them. In a video game, a narrative plot is configured in which a
character (more commonly referred to as an avatar) interacts with a virtual world
that includes other characters and virtual events. Events in a game are organised in a
narrative whole, in the plot of the game.5 In this process of emplotment, the
character’s actions influence the unfolding of the narrative. At the same time, the
5 Notably, the notion of narrative plays an important role in the design of virtual environments (Aylett
1999).
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specific organisations of events and characters of the game configure the actions of
the avatar. The plot and narrative are thus continuously co-authored by the
technology and the humans. Secondly, we can consider the degree of abstraction in
technological mediation by video games. This differs according to the type of game
that is played, but in general the configuration of the plot remains close to the world
of human action. The characters interact as in a theatre play: directly with other
characters through actual events (for instance through combat, barter, and
discourse). Moreover, the organisation of events is not strictly chronological, but
includes a-chronological dimensions. A video game can include oscillations
between separate events and the plot as a whole (for example by relating ‘‘missions’’
to ‘‘campaigns’’), it can include a sense of ending and players might have the
opportunity to ‘‘read’’ time backwards (by means of flashbacks or flash-forwards).
This brings technological mediation through computer games close to the
experience of human time, close to the engaging world of action.
Active, Abstracting Technologies
The fourth hermeneutic category in our framework is concerned with narrative
technologies that actively configure our narrative time and instantiate a technolog-
ical mediation that abstracts from the world of action. Here we discuss electronic
monetary technology as a paradigmatic example. Consider the practice of electronic
trading. On global financial exchanges, algorithmic trading systems mediate trades
by representing transactions on the trading screen and by mediating trade
executions: trade is effectively delegated to algorithms that conduct trades much
faster than humans and can therefore take advantage of very small price differences.
Such algorithmic trading technologies actively configure narrative time because
they ‘‘co-author’’ the trade narrative. The trade is done by humans and by
algorithms; together they configure the narrative structure. However, unlike
engaging narrative technologies like video games, they do this in a way that
abstracts from the narrative they instantiate. Although they mediate actual events
(trades) and actual characters (traders), the narrative time they configure is remote
from the level of human action and instead operates on a calculative, mathematical
level. Phenomenologically and hermeneutically speaking, the trade is about
numbers that represent quasi-characters (hedge funds, options, securities) and
quasi-events (derivative trades, currency swaps) configured in a quasi-plot (e.g.,
‘‘the flash crash’’6) and no longer about first-order characters (traders, producers)
and events (a person can no longer sell a good because the price—a higher-order
entity—has gone up). Moreover, the narrative time of electronic monetary
technologies is rigorously subjected to chronological time-dimensions. Chronolog-
ical timing of trades is the essence of modern trading machines and the sequence of
the operations for the execution of transactions is critical to the functioning of the
6 The flash crash was ‘‘a brief period of extreme market volatility on May 6, 2010,’’ that was influenced
by the practice of algorithmic high frequency trading (Kirilenko et al. 2011: 1).
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system. Modern finance, in other words, nearly obliterates the a-chronological
aspects of the trading narrative.7
Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we have shown how Ricoeur’s narrative theory can be used to construct a
theoretical framework for understanding technological mediation. By doing so, we
respond to the current neglect of language and the social in theories of technological
mediation in philosophy of technology. The concept of narrative technologies helps us
to analyse the temporal dimensions of technologies, highlight their social and
linguistic aspects, and re-theorise their mediating role in terms of their narrative
capacities. The framework we constructed is based on two hermeneutic distinctions:
between active, passive and between engaging, abstracting narrative technologies.
We considered the extent to which technologies are similar to the paradigm of the
written text by examining how they actively configure characters and events in a
meaningful whole (instantiating a process of emplotment). By doing so, we were able
to analyse how the linguistic and material aspects of technologies interrelate.
Moreover, we considered the extent to which technologies configure narrative
structures that are abstracted from the world of action. We did so by examining the
configuration of second- and third order entities and the inclusion of chronological vis-
a`-vis a-chronological time dimensions. The value of our narrative approach lies
explicitly and mainly in gaining novel insights about the active configuration of
technologies such as ICTs and perhaps less so in the understanding of passive
narrative technologies since these can already be analysed by means of existing
approaches in philosophy of technology focusing on mediation.
By means of our theory of narrative technologies, we have constructed a
hermeneutic framework that helps us to understand how technologies configure in-
tersubjective relations and how these relations can be traced back to the subjective
realm of human action. By doing so, we can capture the difference between what in
mediation theory is referred to as the difference between macroperception (cultural,
hermeneutic perception) and microperception (sensory perception) (Verbeek 2005:
123). In contrast to mediation theory, however, we can relate the sometimes-
abstracted mediations of intersubjective relations with the subjective experiences of
these mediations by means of retrodiction. In a similar vein, we can confront
theories in the analytic philosophical tradition that base the construction of the
world of technology on the workings of language. For instance, our theory can be
employed to critically assess and enrich John Searle’s Construction of Social Reality
(1995) by showing how intentionality at the individual level relates to collective
intentionality. Instead of stating, as Searle does, that these levels relate to different
primitive biological processes, we can show how narrative structures and narrative
technologies enable people to engage with one-another in a social, technologically
mediated world. In further work, we intend to elaborate on the ways in which our
7 Narrative capacities of electronic monetary technologies are discussed more in-depth in a paper on
crypto currencies as narrative technologies (Coeckelbergh and Reijers 2015).
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theory of narrative technologies relates to other theories of technology and how we
can expand the method of retrodiction in our analysis of specific technologies.
As an avenue for future research, we might explore ways in which technologies
explicitly mediate the public experience of time and analyse the political aspects of
such mediation. In light of one of Ricoeur’s latest works, Memory, History,
Forgetting, we can inquire how technologies shape those things that we remember,
those things that we forget and thereby also the ways we relate to our personal and
collective histories. One of the aims of Ricoeur’s book is to construct ideas about
policies for ‘‘just allotment of memory’’ (2004: xv). As much as political authorities
and historical representations as elements of the ‘‘human historical condition’’ can
‘‘stand in’’ for our collective past (Kelly 2006: 677), so—we would argue—can
technologies. Such a view suggests that, just as a historical narrative can ‘‘stand in’’
or ‘‘re-present’’ a collective memory of a past event, so can technologies ‘‘stand in’’
for a past event; or at least configure it in a specific way. This observation ties in
with debates on for instance the so-called ‘‘right to be forgotten’’ (Rosen 2012)
about personal rights to control the presence or absence of digital memories, which
arguably for the first time explicitly puts the technological mediation of human
memory on political agendas. Such a focus on the technological mediation of public
time as a social and political issue might add to current phenomenological
approaches in sociology, such as Shutz’s Phenomenology of the Social World, by
analysing how technologies can influence the ‘‘worlds of direct experience, of
contemporaries, of predecessors and of successors’’ (2012: 45).
Moreover, we might consider the prospects for deploying the theory of narrative
technologies as an ethical theory of technology. In Time and Narrative, Ricoeur
asserts that a narrative structure ‘‘presupposes not just ‘doers’ but characters endowed
with ethical qualities that make them noble or vile’’ (1983: 59). This suggests a link
between Ricoeur’s theory and virtue ethics, which could be applied to evaluating new
technologies. More generally, by incorporating Ricoeur’s theory, our framework can
be considered not merely hermeneutic but also normative: the extent to which
technologies actively configure narrative structures, and the extent to which they
abstract from the world of action, has implications for evaluating technologies, and in
particular specific human-technology relations. For instance, distances between first
order and higher order entities can be normatively significant. As an illustration, we
can observe that the world of finance and economics is characterised by such
distances. For example, a character such as ‘the market’ is a third order, abstract entity.
Through the mediation of technologies that represent the market in terms of abstract
numbers, the human narrative time of first order characters and events behind it remain
invisible (Coeckelbergh and Reijers 2015). The transactions become a matter of
calculations, removed from real people, real events, and related material realities,
thereby creating moral and social distance (Coeckelbergh 2015b). It is the task of an
ethics of narrative technologies to make such problematic narrative structures visible,
and to make recommendations for dealing with these problems.
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